KANT Critique of Pure Reason, Preface to the 2 nd ed., From the beginning (B VII)
up "... and filodoxia philosophy" (B XXXVII)
1. Transcendental analysis of scientific knowledge.
1.1. Terms of scientific knowledge.
1.2. Transcendental conception of a priori.
1.3. The Copernican revolution.
2. Transcendental critique of metaphysics.
2.1. The distinction between phenomenon and noumenon.
2.2. Negative sense of criticism: theoretical limitation of the use of reason
to phenomena.
2.3. Positive sense of criticism: the defense of the practical use of reason.
2.4. Metaphysics, criticism and illustration.
Model 1
The metaphysics that has remained until This in a state so hesitant, uncertain and contradictory, is due solely to the fact it was not filed before the problem-and perhaps even the distinction, for analytical and synthetic judgments. Solution of this problem or sufficient evidence that there is no possibility at all that she wants to see cleared up, it depends which hold or not metaphysics. David Hume, the philosopher who most penetrated into this problem, but
see, not even close, its generality and specificity sufficiently, but simply staying in the synthetic proposition linking the effect to its cause (principium causalitatis) believed show that this proposition was totally impossible a priori. According to the conclusions of Hume, what we call metaphysics would become a mere illusion of rational knowledge of anything alleged that, in fact, only comes from experience and acquire the appearance of necessity due to usual. If Hume had been mindful of our problem in its universality, he never would have thought such a statement, which removes all pure philosophy. In fact, I had seen that, in his own reasoning, would not be possible to pure mathematics, since it does contain a priori synthetic propositions. His sound understanding would have prevented him from making such an assertion. The solution of this problem includes, at a time, the possibility of using pure reason in the foundation and development of all sciences which contain theoretical knowledge a priori of objects, ie, includes answering the following questions: How can mathematics pure? How is pure natural science possible?
As such science and are actually given, it is appropriate to ask how they are possible, since that must be demonstrated by their reality. In regard to metaphysics, negative progress to date has continued to doubt everyone, rightly, of their possibility. This on the one hand, on the other, none of the forms taken until now for metaphysics to suggest, as far as regards its essential purpose, which really exists. (I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Introduction.)
QUESTIONS:
1. Text summarizes the ideas in your summary displaying argumentative or expository structure developed by the author
2. Analyzes the meaning in the text of "synthetic a priori propositions" and "pure use of reason and Define it.
4. Briefly discuss any aspect of the thought of the author of the text you deem important in any of these ways: on its relationship with other philosophers,
with relevant historical events (especially if they are contemporaries of the author or are related to their life) or features significant contemporary world
EDITORIAL Metaphysics, criticism and illustration.
MODEL 2
Now it seems natural that, abandoned after the experience, 1 is not immediately lift a building whose provenance knowledge base already has ignored principles of unknown origin, without having previously ascertained their validity through careful analysis. It seems obvious, therefore, that [rather] should arise before the issue of understanding how to acquire all the knowledge a priori and which are the extension, the legitimacy and value of them. In fact, nothing is more natural, if natural word means what you might reasonably expect to happen. But if by natural we understand what usually happens, nothing is more natural and understandable that the fact that this investigation has been long neglected. As part of such knowledge, [and] those of mathematics, have long trusted, and therefore it gives rise to promising prospects to other knowledge, but these others are of entirely different nature. In addition, once crossed the circle of experience, we have full assurance of being refuted by it. So great is the attraction we feel for expanding our knowledge, that can stop our progress, only to stumble with a clear contradiction. But this contradiction can be avoided by simple means to develop cautiously fiction, why not cease to be. Mathematics We offer a shining example of how far we can go in the a priori knowledge regardless of experience. Indeed, this discipline is only concerned with objects and knowledge to the extent they are represented in intuition. But that fact is easily overlooked, as this insight may be, in turn, given a priori, which is hardly distinguishable from a simple pure concept. Excited by such proof of the power of reason, our tendency to spread the knowledge does not recognize any limit. The light dove, he feels the resistance of the air that flies to fly freely, would imagine that would fly much better even in a vacuum. In the same way Plato left the world of the senses, to impose limits as close to understanding. Plato dared to go beyond them, flying in empty space of pure reason by the wings of ideas. He did not realize that with all his efforts, not moving anything, and he had no foothold, so to speak, had no basis which to sustain and where to apply forces to promote understanding.
(I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Introduction.)
QUESTIONS:
1. Text summarizes the ideas in your summary displaying argumentative or narrative structure developed by the author
2. Analyzes the meaning in the text of "knowledge a priori "and" intuition "and Define it.
4. Briefly discuss any aspect of the thought of the author of the text you deem important in any of these ways: on its relationship with other philosophers, transcendental
EDITORIAL Analysis of scientific knowledge.
MODEL 3 trials experience, as such, are all synthetic. It would be absurd to found an analytical trial experience, to put it because I have not come out of my concept. I do not need, therefore, no evidence of experience. "A body is extended" is a proposition that holds a priori, not a trial experience, since even before the draw on the experience I have in the concept of body all requirements of the trial. Just so I can extract the predicate concept, according to the principle of contradiction, and, while he alone made me become aware of the need for trial, need ever experience taught me. By contrast, even including the predicate 'heavy' in the concept of body in general, this concept means an object of experience through a part of it. This part I can add, then elsewhere as belonging to past experience. I can recognize in advance the concept of body analytically by extension properties, impenetrability, shape, etc.., all of which are thought by that means. But now expanding my knowledge and looking back the experience that had drawn the concept of body, I find that the weight is always attached to these properties and therefore I add to that concept as a predicate synthetic. The possibility of synthesis of the predicate 'heavy' with the concept of body
16, therefore, based on experience, because, although both concepts are not contained in each other, are in mutual correspondence, but only fortuitously, as part of a whole, ie as part of an experience that is, in turn, a connection Synthetic between intuitions. In the case of synthetic judgments a priori, we need the aid entirely. What I support and which makes possible the synthesis if I want to go beyond the concept A to recognize that another concept B is linked to the first, since in this case I have the advantage of going with the experience to view ? Consider the proposition: "Everything that happens has its cause." The concept of "something happening" I, of course, an existence which precedes a time, etc., And such a concept can be detached analytical judgments. But the concept of cause [is completely out of the previous concept and] points to something other than 'what happens'; is therefore not contained in the latter representation. How do I, therefore, to say "what happens" something completely different and to recognize that the concept of cause belongs "to what happens [and even as necessary], but not contained in it? What is here that the unknown X is based on the understanding that when he thinks finding out the concept to a predicate B strange at first, he considers, however, as linked with it? Can not be the experience, because that principle has not only added the second representation to the first increasing its generality, but also expressing necessity, that is so completely a priori and from mere concepts. The ultimate aim of our speculative knowledge a priori is based entirely on synthetic or extend such principles. For although analytic judgments are very important and necessary, but they are aiming to achieve the clarity of concepts required for a comprehensive synthesis and secure, as befits an acquisition really new.
(I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Introduction).
QUESTIONS:
1. Text summarizes the ideas in your summary displaying argumentative or narrative structure developed by the author
2. Analyzes the meaning in the text of "analytic judgments" and "synthetic judgments a priori.
4. Briefly discuss any aspect of the thought of the author of the text you deem important in any of these ways: on its relationship with other philosophers,
EDITORIAL: The possibility of metaphysics as a science according to Kant.
Model 4 more important [than the above] is the fact that some even leave the field knowledge of all possible experience and having the appearance of our judgments extend beyond all the limits of the same concepts through which may correspond to any empirical object. It is precisely in these latter skills that go beyond the world of the senses and the experience can not provide guidance or rectification or, where the ratio of those
research develops, their size, we regard as most salient and most important purpose that everything can learn the understanding of the phenomenal field. We prefer to deal with it all, even at the risk of mistakes, rather than abandon such urgent investigations for lack of resolution, disdain or indifference. [These inevitable problems of the same pure reason are God, freedom and immortality. But science, with all dressings, has the sole ultimate objective to solve the metaphysical. This science must be initially in a dogmatic, ie confidently undertake the performance of a task as daunting without analyzing in advance the ability or inability of reason to carry it out.] Now it seems natural that, after leaving the experience, not immediately lift a building whose knowledge base ignore origin and early account of unknown origin have been previously ascertained their validity through careful analysis. It seems obvious, therefore, that [rather] should arise before the issue of understanding how to acquire all the knowledge a priori and which are the extension, the legitimacy and value of them. In fact, nothing is more natural, if by natural word means what you might reasonably expect to happen. But if by natural we understand what usually happens, nothing is more natural and understandable that the fact that this investigation has been long neglected. As part of such knowledge, [and] those of mathematics, have long trusted, and therefore it gives rise to promising prospects to other knowledge, but these others are of entirely different nature. In addition, once crossed the circle of experience, we have full assurance of being refuted by it. So great is the attraction we feel for expanding our knowledge, that only you can stop our progress the offense with an obvious contradiction. But this contradiction can be avoided by simple means to develop cautiously fiction, why not cease to be. (I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, "Introduction").
QUESTIONS:
1. Text summarizes the ideas in your summary displaying argumentative or narrative structure developed by the author
2 .. Analyzes the meaning in the text of "a priori knowledge."
4. Briefly discuss any aspect of the thought of the author of the text you deem important in any of these ways: on its relationship with other philosophers,
EDITORIAL: The need for critique of reason pure and limits of knowledge.
